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COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM POST-SCHAFFER: THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PREEMPTION IN SPECIAL 
EDUCATION 
Lara Gelbwasser Freed* 
Cooperative Federalism has been, to date, a short expression 
for a constantly increasing concentration of power at 
Washington in the instigation and supervision of local 
policies. . . . [T]oday[,] the question faces us whether the 
constituent States of the [Federal} System can be ... saved as 
the vital cells that they have been heretofore of democratic 
sentiment, impulse, and action. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Faced with federal statutory silence as to who bears the 
burden of proof in a special education due process hearing, the 
Supreme Court in Schaffer v. Weast followed the ordinary 
"default rule" that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove 
their claims.2 The Court allocated the burden of proof3 to the 
* Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.S., Cornell University, School ofindustrial 
and Labor Relations; J.D., Harvard Law School. The author would like to acknowledge 
the support of the Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Stipend Program. The 
author would also like to thank Dana Brakman-Reiser for her thoughtful comments on 
earlier drafts of this Article. Finally, the author would like to thank her fam ily for their 
love and support. 
1. EdwardS. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 21, 23 
(1950). 
2. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56-57 (2005); see KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., 
McCORMI CK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (5th ed. 1999) ("The burdens of pleading and proof 
with regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to the plaintiff who 
genera lly seeks to change the present state of affairs a nd who therefore naturally 
should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.") . But see S chaffer, 
546 U. S. at 62 (Stevens, J. , concurring) ("It is common ground that no 8ingle principle 
or rule solves all cases by setting forth a general test for ascertaining the incidence of 
proof burdens when both a statute and its legislative history are silent on the 
question."). 
3. While the term "burden of proof' historically encompassed both the "burden of 
persuasion" (which party loses if the evidence is closely balanced) and the "burden of 
production" (which party bears the obligation to come forward with the evidence), only 
the burden of persuasion was at issue in Schaffer. 546 U.S. at 55-56. Accordingly, this 
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party seeking relief-typically, parents challenging a student's 
individualized education program (IEP) under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).4 The Court limited its 
holding, however, to the "case at hand," where parents of a 
middle school student with learning disabilities and speech-
language impairments challenged an IEP offered by a school 
district in Maryland. 5 In doing so, the Court left open a 
question of widespread reach: that is, whether states may 
override the default rule and always place the burden of proof 
on the school district at an administrative hearing challenging 
a student's IEP.6 
This article posits that state-led legislation expressly 
indicating who has the burden of proof is the correct result, 
consistent with the IDEA's statutory text, purpose, and history, 
and the Supreme Court's holding in Schaffer. Thus, while much 
of the scholarship surrounding Schaffer focuses on the proper 
allocation of the burden of proof as between parents and the 
school district, this article shifts the focus back to the proper 
entity to determine that allocation as between states and the 
federal government. Clarifying states' right to determine the 
burden of proof in special education due process hearings is 
critical to preserving the integrity of states' decision-making as 
state legislation takes shape. 
For many states, Schaffer went against a long-standing 
practice of assigning the burden of proof to the school district, 
which was believed to be in a better position to defend the 
appropriateness of an IEP.7 At the time of Schaffer, seven 
states8 had statutes or regulations expressly assigning the 
Article refers to the burden of persuasion when using the term "burden of proof." 
4. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61. The IDEA is the primary federal law governing 
special education services for children with disabilities. S ee 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-141 5. 
For consistency, this Article refers to both the current federal law and its predecessors 
as "the IDEA," unless otherwise specified. 
5. Schaffer, 546 U.S . a t 61. 
6. Id. 
7. Among the federal appellate courts that considered the burden of proof 
question before Schaffer, the First, Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth , a nd District 
of Columbia Circuits had held that school hoards bore the burden of proof. States under 
the jurisdiction of these circuits that did not have state statutes or regulations 
expressly assigning the burden of proof included Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada , New Hampshire, New J ersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. 
8. Those states were Alaska, Connecticut, Washington D.C. (included as a 
"state" here for ease of reference) , Delaware, Georgia, Minnesota, and West Virginia. 
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burden of proof to the school district in an IDEA due process 
hearing. 9 However, because Maryland had no such statute or 
regulation, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to address 
whether its allocation of the burden of proof under the IDEA 
preempted contrary state legislation. 10 To date, Congress has 
maintained legislative silence on this question. Indeed, the 
final implementing regulations for the IDEA's most recent 
amendments simply defer to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Schaffer on the burden of proof allocation and note that 
"further regulation in this area is unnecessary." 11 
Justice Breyer, dissenting in Schaffer, would have left the 
allocation decision entirely to the states, such that an 
administrative law judge (ALJ) or hearing officer would 
determine how general state administrative procedures apply 
in the absence of IDEA-specific burden of proof legislation. 12 
Neither party raised this argument in Schaffer. 
In the wake of Schaffer, however, a variant of Justice 
Breyer's dissent-
respecting states' right to determine the burden of proof as 
a matter of "cooperative federalism"-has actually begun to 
See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit . 4, § 52.550(e)(9) (2003); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-
14 (2005); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5, § 3030.3 (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3140 
(1999); GA. COMP. R. & REGS.l60-4-7. 18(1)(g)(8) (2002); MINN. STAT.§ 125A.091, subd. 
16 (2004); and W. VA. CODER. § 126-16-S.l.ll(c) (2005). While Alabama's previous 
administrative code rules, cited in Schaffer, provided that the school district assume 
the burden of proof regarding the appropriateness of services proposed or provided in 
impartial due process hearings, Alabama's new rules , effective as regular rules on 
Septe mber 15, 2005, shifted that burden. See ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-8-9.08(8)(c) 
(2005) (providing that the party filing the hearing request has the burden to prove 
his/her allegations to be fact). Illinois' statutes-both at the time of Schaffer and 
currently-refer only to the school district's duty to present evidence in impartial due 
process hearings , with no express assignment of the burden of persuasion. See 105 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/14-8.02a(g-55) (2007). 
9. The IDEA provides parents and school districts with the opportunity for an 
impartial due process hearing whenever they are involved in a complaint regarding a 
public school's identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a chi ld, or the 
provision of a free appropriate public education to such child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(!) and 
§1415(b)(6)(A). Section 1415(!) requires that a State or local education agency conduct 
the hearing, as determined by State law or by the State educational agency. The party 
requesting the hearing must confine the subject matter of the hearing to issues raised 
in the due process complaint notice, unless the other party agrees otherwise. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(4)(3)(B). The amount of the hearing officer's discre tion to find statutory 
violations depends upon whether the alleged violations are substantive or procedural. 
See infra note 52. 
10. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61-62. 
11. See 71 Fed. Reg. 46540, 46706 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 
300 & 301). The final implementing regulations took effect on October 13, 2006. 
12. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 68--69 (Breyer, J. , dissenting). 
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emerge. Lower federal courts have upheld the validity of state 
statutes and regulations expressly placing the burden of proof 
on the school district in impartial due process hearings under 
the IDEA. 13 Meanwhile, states with and without statutory or 
regulatory IDEA-specific burden-of-proof schemes at the time 
of Schaffer have moved to legislate the burden of proof to either 
undo or redo the status quo pre-Schaffer. 
The model of cooperative federalism emerging post-
Schaffer, however, is only robust to the extent that federal 
courts uniformly respect states' authority to statutorily assign 
the burden of proof, while states legislate the burden of proof in 
response to state and local needs and policy priorities. 
Departing from this model, the Eighth Circuit recently held it 
was a "fundamental error" for the ALJ and District Court to 
assign the burden of persuasion to a Minnesota school district 
in a special education due process hearing, despite the fact that 
Minnesota has a statute specifically allocating the burden of 
proof to the school district at such a hearing. 14 Moreover, some 
recent state activity regarding the IDEA burden of proof 
reflects efforts to amend existing legislation or stall proposed 
legislation based, in part, on compliance with federal law. 15 
These efforts are misplaced and counter-productive. The 
discourse should not be about reconciling "inconsistent" legal 
principles or "circumventing" the Supreme Court's decision in 
Schaffer, but about holding state legislatures and officials 
accountable for what remains their decision. 
To begin, Part II of this article addresses what is at stake 
with the placement of the burden of proof in impartial due 
process hearings, and why it matters who gets to decide. Next, 
Part III traces the IDEA's statutory design as a model of 
cooperative federalism and, in keeping with this design, 
questions the propriety of a national, uniform burden-of-proof 
rule. 
The article then turns to the post-Schaffer legal landscape 
in Parts IV and V. Part IV explores the rationale of federal 
court decisions that have addressed the preemption question 
left unsettled by the Supreme Court and Congress. Part V 
examines the IDEA-specific burden of proof legislation 
13. See infra Part IV. 
14. M.M. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 F.3d 455, 458-59 (8th Cir. 2008). 
15. See infra Part V. 
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developing across the states in their efforts to respond to 
Schaffer's change in federal law, and analyzes state policy 
"choices" as they appear motivated by or hidden behind the 
need to align state procedure with federal law. Finally, Part VI 
provides a brief conclusion. 
II. WHAT IS AT STAKE 
The burden of proof was outcome-determinative in Schaffer. 
Brian Schaffer's parents believed that Brian needed smaller 
classes and more intensive services, so they initiated a due 
process hearing to challenge the initial IEP proposed by the 
Montgomery County Public Schools System (MCPS). 16 After a 
three-day hearing, "the ALJ deemed the evidence close, held 
that the parents bore the burden of persuasion, and ruled in 
favor of the school district." 17 On reconsideration of the case, 
following the district court's conclusion that the burden 
properly belonged on the school district, the ALJ deemed the 
evidence "truly in 'equipoise"' and ruled in favor of the 
parents.18 On appeal, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit 
reversed, finding no persuasive reason to depart from the 
normal rule allocating the burden to the party seeking relief. 19 
The Supreme Court affirmed.20 
Cases likes Schaffer, where the evidence is in "precise 
equipoise," should be rare. 21 Indeed, one week after the 
Supreme Court decided Schaffer, a special education lawyer 
opined that "only a foolhardy parents' lawyer would ever 
approach a case and factor in [the] burden of proof in strategic 
decision-making."22 
16. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 54-55. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. Around the time of the District Court's decision, MCPS offered Brian a 
placement in a high school with a special learning center. Brian's parents accepted and 
Brian was educated in that program until he graduated from high school. The suit 
remained alive, however, because Brian's parents sought compensation for his private 
school tuition and related expenses. 
19. Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004) . 
20. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 49. 
21. Id. at 68 (Breyer, J., dissenting) . 
22. Posting of Charles P. Fox to Special Education Law Blog, "Schaffer v. Weast: 
The Sky is Not Falling" (Nov. 21, 2005), 
http://specialedlaw.blogs.com/home/2005/11/shaffer_ v _ weast.html (Nov. 21, 2005, 19:30 
CST); see also Arkansas Governor's DD Center. Supreme Court Ruling's Impact, A 
White Paper, http://www.ddcouncil.org/pdfs/whitepaper.pdf (concluding that placing 
the burden of persuasion on parents challenging an IEP "should not be a disadvantage 
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The significance of the burden of proof, however, extends 
beyond its outcome- determinative nature. Placement of the 
burden of proof, with its attendant considerations of "policy ... 
convenience ... [and] fairness," 23 raises the question of how 
best to balance costs, resources, access to information, and 
expertise, in the context of ensuring a "free appropriate public 
education"24 for all children with disabilities. Answers to this 
question are, not surprisingly, highly politicized. More than 
twenty disability organizations and twelve states filed amicus 
briefs with the Supreme Court in Schaffer. The United States 
itself switched sides by the time the case reached the Supreme 
Court. This flip-flop offers a neat glimpse into the competing 
policy arguments surrounding the burden-of-proof allocation. 
In 2000, the United States filed an amicus brief before the 
Fourth Circuit, arguing that the District Court correctly placed 
the burden of proof on the school district to show the adequacy 
of its proposed IEP at the due process administrative hearing.25 
The United States warned that holding otherwise would 
"unhinge" the IDEA's statutory framework; that is, a school 
would be allowed to propose an IEP, and then abstain from the 
school's statutory obligation to provide a free appropriate 
public education, by forcing parents who disagree with the IEP 
to prove that it is inadequate.26 
[for parents] compared to present (good) practice"). But see Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. 
Sch. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 2d 559, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) , rev'd on other wounds. 2007 WL 
1545988 (2007) (recognizing that "[w)hen one does not have the burden of proof [in an 
IDEA due process hearing] , sound litigation strategy might well dicta te tha t certain 
questions not be asked, that record ma tters left open by an opponent not be cla rified, 
that witnesses whose testimony would otherwise be necessary not be called, and that 
exhibits tha t could have been relied on not be int roduced"); Antoine M. v. Chester 
Upland Sch. Dist., 420 F. Supp. 2d 396, 404- 05 (E.D. Pa . 2006) (recognizing that 
parents' decision to present new expert testimony at the district court level may be 
rela ted to S chaffer's shift in the burden of proof at the administra tive hearing). 
23. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 337. 
24. A "free appropriate public education" refers to "special educa tion and related 
services that-A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and 
direction, without cha rge; (B) meet the standards of t he State educa tional a gency; (C) 
include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in 
the State involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized 
education program r equired under section 1414(d) of thi s ti tle" 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) 
(2005). 
25. Brief for the United States a s Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees Urging 
Affirmance at *5, Schaffer v. Vance, 2 F. App'x 232 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-147 1), 2000 
WL 33991818. 
26. ld.; see also N. J. DEP'T OF THE P UI3. ADVOCATE, DIY. Of DEY. DISABILITY 
ADVOCACY, ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN SP EC IAL EOUCATION DU E 
PROCESS HEARINGS 12 (2007) [hereinafter SPECIAL EDUCATIO N Dm: Pl(()CESSl. 
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In rebutting school board association arguments that the 
IDEA already provides sufficient procedural safeguards for 
parents, the United States recognized the disconnect between 
the procedural right to be involved and actual involvement or 
meaningful inputY Unlike school districts which retain 
taxpayer-financed lawyers and rely on the school's own 
employees to testify in due process hearings, parents of 
children with disabilities are often unable to afford legal 
counsel and expert witnesses.28 Studies have revealed that 
most parents describe themselves as "terrified and 
inarticulate" in IEP meetings, and that professionals 
acknowledge their use of knowledge and language that parents 
do not understand. 29 Moreover, while the IDEA provides that 
parents have access to their child's records and evaluations or 
recommendations that the school intends to use at a due 
process hearing, 30 schools are not required to produce evidence 
of how other similarly situated children have fared in proposed 
programs or placements. As explained by New Jersey's Public 
Advocate, for example, a school district would be unlikely to 
introduce evidence showing that a particular autism program 
had a history of failures-information that parents may have 
27. ld. at *15--16; see also MAHK KELMAN & GiLLIAN LESTER, J UMPI NG THE 
QUEUE: AN lN<~UIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING 
DI SABII.ITH:S 87 (1997) (s tudying the IDEA's implementation in local practice). 
28. See Sta tement of the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) 
Amicus Committee (Jan. 2006) , http://www.copaa.net/news/schaffer .html. See generally 
M. WAGNE I{, C. MARDER, J. BLACKORBY, & D. CARDOSO, THE CHILDREN WE SEINE: THE 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHAHACTEHISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES AND THEIH HOUSEHOLDS 23-24, 28-29 (2002) , 
http://www .seels.net/designdocs/SEELS_ Children_ We_Serve_Report.pdf. While parents 
now have the right to challen ge a school district's IEP in court without legal counsel, 
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007), that right does not 
alleviate parents' inability to navigate the IDEA "maze" themselves, from identifica tion 
and evaluation through hearings and court actions. The Supreme Court's ruling in 
Arlington u. Murphy added to the expense of exercising due process hearing rights , as 
the Court h eld prevailing parents cannot recover non-attorney expert fees under the 
IDEA's fee-shifting provision. 548 U.S. 291 , 299-300 (2006). 
29. David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational 
Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 188-89 (1991); see also 
NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, lMPHOVING THE IMPLEMENTATION Of' THE INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DlSABILlTIES EDUCATION ACT: MAKING SCHOOLS WOHK FOR ALL OF AMERICA'S 
CHILDREN (1995) , http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/1995/95school.htm 
(reporting parents' testimony that the IEP process is "extremely frustrating, often 
intimidating, and hardly ever conducive to making them feel tha t they were equal 
partners with professionals"). 
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1) and§ 1415(f)(2)(A) (2005). 
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no other way of accessing. 31 However, if the school district bore 
the burden of proof to establish the adequacy of an IEP, the 
district would have to present proof that the program in 
question works. 32 
In its brief before the Fourth Circuit, the United States 
conceded that having schools carry the burden of proof 
regarding the adequacy of a proposed IEP "should not 
substantially increase the workload for the school."33 The 
United States also rejected the school's argument that 
deference to state and local authorities' expertise creates a 
presumption in favor of the IEP placement proposed by school 
districts. According to the United States, applying a 
presumption of correctness to a draft IEP rejected by parents 
would "unjustifiably reduce" the IDEA's goal of making parents 
meaningful participants in the IEP process. 34 
Nonetheless, in June 2005, after a change in 
administration, the United States changed positions and filed 
an amicus brief supporting Respondents (the MCPS 
Superintendent and the Board of Education) before the 
Supreme Court in Schaffer. By way of a footnote in its brief, 
31. See SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE PROCESS, supra note 26, at 12. 
32. ld. 
33. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees Urging 
Affirmance at *12, Schaffer, 2 F. App'x. 232 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1471), 2000 WL 
33991818. The school is already required to evaluate (and reevaluate, if necessary) a 
child's educational needs by consulting with various school officials and other 
individuals who have knowledge or special expertise regarding the child. 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1414(a), 1414(d)(B) (2005). After a school conducts an evaluation of a child, the 
school must provide the parents of that child with prior written notice that describes 
the action proposed or refused, the tests and procedures used as a basis for 
determining that particular course of action, why the school proposed or refused to take 
the action, and why other options were rejected. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1) (2005). If the 
school has not sent a prior written notice regarding the subject matter of a parent's due 
process complaint, the school must answer such a complaint, in writing, with the same 
information. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(i)(l) (2005). Moreover, in drafting an IEP, the 
school must describe, inter alia, the child's disability, how the disability affects the 
child's involvement and progress in the general education curriculum, the special 
education and related services to be provided, expectations for the child's progress 
under the IEP, and how that progress will be measured. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) 
(2005). 
34. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees Urging 
Affirmance at *11, Schaffer, 2 F. App'x 232 (4th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1471), 2000 WL 
33991818; see also Reply Brief of Petitioners at *6, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (No. 04-698), 
2005 WL 1812490 (reasoning that when there is only a proposed IEP, with no 
agreement reached between parents and the school district, there is no official action to 
which a "presumption of regularity" can attach). Similarly, when there is no previously 
established IEP, neither side can claim that its proposal represents the status quo. Id. 
at *4 . 
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the United States explained that: 
[a]fter careful review of its administrative practice, the 
relevant case law, and the text, structure and history of the 
IDEA, including the 2004 Amendments to the Act, the 
government is now of the view that, where as here, a State 
has not placed the burden of proof on school districts as a 
matter of state law, the traditional rule that the burden of 
proof falls on the party seeking relief applies to IDEA due 
process hearings. 35 
111 
The United States now agreed with the school board's 
argument that the IDEA's procedural safeguards were 
sufficient to address any policy concerns regarding schools' 
unfair advantage over parents. 36 According to the United 
States' new position, Congress' aim to restore trust and reduce 
litigation with the 2004 IDEA amendments would be 
undermined by imposing a "non-textual" burden of proof on 
schools that amounts to a "presumption of invalidity" for 
actions by public officials and is "foreign· to analogous civil and 
administrative proceedings.'>)? 
The 2004 IDEA amendments added informal resolution 
opportunities for parents and schools. Voluntary mediation 
must now be available, even for matters arising before the 
filing of a due process hearing request. 38 Due process disputes 
that are not mediated are subject to a new, mandatory 
"resolution session" attended by parents, school officials, and 
35. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *6 
n.2 , Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698) , 2005 WL 1527082. 
36. ld. at *26-27. Prior to the 2004 amendments, however, the IDEA already 
required that parents be informed about and consent to evaluations of their child. 20 
U.S.C . § 1414(c)(3) (2005). Parents were already included as members of "IEP Teams." 
20 U.S .C. § 1415(b)(l) (2005). Parents had the right to examine all records relating to 
their child, and to obtain an "independent educational evaluation" of their child. 20 
U.S. C. § 1415(b)(l) (2005). Parents had to be given written prior notice of any changes 
in an IEP, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2005), and be notified in writing of the procedural 
safeguards available to them under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(l)(A) (2005). If 
parents believed an IEP was inappropriate, they had the right to seek an 
administrative "impartial due process hearing," where they could present evidence and 
cross-examine relevant witnesses with the assistance of legal counsel. 20 U.S.C. §§ 
1415(£) and 1415(h)(1)-(2) (2005). Parents could also appeal an adverse hearing decision 
to a state review officer, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2005), where applicable, before 
challenging an administrative decision in state or federal court, 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(2)(A) (2005). Prevailing parents could recover attorneys' fees. 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2005). 
37. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *24-
25, Schaffer, 546 U.S . 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 WL 1527082. 
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)( l) (2005). 
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relevant IEP team members, with the possibility of a binding 
settlement if the parties reach an agreement.39 
Drawing on Congress' intent to reduce the IDEA's 
administrative and litigation-related costs with the 2004 
amendments, respondents in Schaffer argued that placing the 
burden on schools would encourage litigious parents to "snub 
the intended IEP process, or turn it into a dry run or fishing 
expedition for adjudication."40 The 2004 amendments, however, 
provide a built-in disincentive against "fishing expeditions" by 
allowing prevailing schools to recover attorneys' fees if parents 
are found to have filed a frivolous or improper complaint.41 
Moreover, as warned by those opposing the default rule, 
assigning the burden to parents could actually increase due 
process complaints by decreasing schools' accountability-or, 
alternatively, create a chilling effect on parents' meritorious, 
due process complaints.42 
The policy tensions and uncertainty surrounding the 
burden-allocation question underscore the importance of states' 
right to decide. The answer need not be the same for all states 
and all purposes. States may opt for different burden-of-proof 
allocations in IDEA due process hearings based on states' 
particular policy priorities and special education needs, shaped 
by differences in, inter alia, states' incomes, population 
compositions, parent and teacher training opportunities, in-
district placement options, intervention and referral services, 
and instructional and support services. In their role as 
"laboratories of experimentation,"43 states can draft provisions 
to account for and potentially vary the burden of persuasion, 
the burden of production, the burden of proof for appeals, the 
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(l)(B)(i)-(iii) (2005). The resolution session provides for a 
mandatory thirty-day cooling off period prior to the initiation of a due process hearing. 
!d. § 1415(f)(l)(B)(ii) (2005). 
40. Brief for Respondents at *36, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005), (No. 04-698), 2005 
WL 1505062. 
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)-(III) . 
42. Oral Argument at *58, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (No. 04-698), 2005 WL 265139 1; 
see also Reply Brief of Petitioner s at *13, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 4H (No. 04-698), 2005 WL 
1812490; Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Weast, 377 F. 3d at 
459 (Luttig, J., dissenting) ("Saddled with a proof burden in administrative 'due 
process' hearings, parents are likely to find a district-proposed IEP 'resistant to 
challenge"')). 
43. See New State lee Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, :311 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) ("To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave 
responsibility ... It is one of the ha ppy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory"). 
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burden of proof at different stages of the IEP process, the 
burden of proof for discipline matters, and/or the burden of 
proof for unilateral private placement tuition reimbursement 
requests. States can also accord the ALJ or hearing officer 
discretion to modify the general burden-of-proof rules in 
individual cases. 
Further, states can gather and analyze data and interview 
local constituents to assess the educational, social, and 
economic outcomes of potential burden-allocation schemes, or 
to study the impact of an allocation scheme already in place. 
Indeed, disability advocates have proposed statewide surveys 
to obtain information regarding: (i) whether there has been any 
appreciable change in the number of due process hearings in 
states where the burden has been shifted from the school 
district to the moving party; (ii) the results of special education 
cases following a change in state burden-of-proof regulations; 
(iii) the number of parent and teacher IDEA training 
opportunities and attendees; and (iv) the actual ability or 
inability of parents to obtain records from their school districts 
about their own child and to access evaluations by individuals 
with expertise in their child's disability.44 New Jersey's 
Department of the Public Advocate solicited widespread input 
from government offices, professional associations, school 
administrators, education professionals, special education 
attorneys, advocates, service providers, and families to 
research Schaffer's impact in reversing New Jersey's long-
standing practice of assigning the burden of proof to the school 
district .45 The D.C. Appleseed Center and DLA Piper Rudnick 
44. See, e.g, Letter from Sonja D. Kerr, Supervising Attorney, Disability Law Ctr. 
of Ala ., to Comm'r Roger Sampson, Dep't of Educ. & Early Dev. 5 (Feb. 8, 2006). 
45. See SPECIAL EDUCATION DUE PROCESS, supra note 26, at 2 (Jan. 2007) 
(concluding that the burden of proof should be reallocated to school districts in New 
,Jersey for the following reasons: "(i) [s]chool districts are in a far better position to bear 
the burden of proof than families; (ii) [a]llowing the burden of proof to remain on 
parents, who are already disadvantaged in this process. will significantly impede their 
ability to enforce their child's educational rights under the IDEA, (iii) [t]he limited 
discovery procedures in due process hearings in New J ersey make it difficult for 
parents to uncover and obtain evidence needed to satisfy the burden of proof .. . ; [and] 
(iv) [a) llocating t he burden of proof to school districts will not place an undue burden on 
school districts or taxpayers, and will not result in an increase in the number of due 
process proceedings initiated by parents ... "). Interestingly, a September 2007 study on 
specia l education fin a ncing and delivery commissioned by the New Jersey School 
Boards Association reached the opposite conclusion regarding the appropriate 
assign ment of the burden of proof in a due process hearing challenging a student's IEP. 
See MARl MOLENAAR & MICHAEL LUCIANO, FINANCING SPECIAL EDUCATION IN NEW 
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LLP are currently performing an outside assessment of the 
effectiveness of D.C.'s regulatory shift in the burden of proof to 
the moving party.46 
Thus, respecting states' right to determine the burden of 
proof as a matter of "cooperative federalism" is about more 
than simply reserving education to the states under the Tenth 
Amendment; it is about leaving room for states to develop best 
practices for special education by tailoring IDEA substantive 
and procedural standards to states' policy priorities and needs 
in a manner that equals or exceeds the federal floor. 
III. THE IDEA: A "COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM" PARADIGM 
"Cooperative federalism," in theory, is "a system in 
which ... divided authority is brought together again" in a way 
that "enables the cooperating governments to benefit from one 
another's special capacities while still preserving the value of 
political pluralism."47 A scholar in the field of environmental 
policy recently described the "operative" principle of 
cooperative federalism as follows: "the federal government 
establishes a policy ... and then enlists the aid of the states, 
through a combination of carrots, such as financial aid, and 
sticks, such as the imposition of constraints ... through federal 
regulation, in pursuing that policy."48 The IDEA, enacted 
pursuant to the Spending Clause,49 fits squarely within this 
J ERSEY, Executive Summary, Sept. 2007. The study recommended, inter alia, that 
state special education regulations reflect the Schaffer decision a nd allocate the burden 
of proof to the plaintiff (usually the parent) because directors of special education 
services believe that this allocation will help facilitate early dispute resolution while 
reducing costs to both parents and school districts . I d. 
46. DLA Piper LLP Pro Bono, Signature Projects, Special Education, 
http://www.dlapiperprobono.com/impact/signatureprojects/casedetail.aspx?case=87. 
According to the resolution adopted by the D.C. Board of Education on March 13, 2006, 
a n evaluation of D.C.'s shift in the burden of proof would incorporate the following 
data: "the number of due process hearings, mediation, success rate of parties seeking 
re lief, the timeliness of responses to parental requests for services, services to students, 
economic savings, and parental satisfaction." D.C. Bd. of Educ. Res. SR06-20 at 2 (D.C. 
2006). 
47. MARTHA DERTHICK, TH E INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
IN MASSACHUSETTS 220 (1970) (analyzing cooperative federalism in the 
implementation of the Social Security Act). 
48. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The 
Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 754 
(2006). 
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the 
IDEA is, in fact , more than a "simple funding statute," as it confers upon disabled 
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model by leaving to the states the "primary responsibility for 
developing and executing educational programs for 
handicapped children," while imposing "significant 
requirements to be followed m the discharge of that 
responsibility" as a pre-requisite for federal financial 
assistance. 50 
Political accountability, however, is uniquely murky when 
it comes to deciding the burden of proof allocation in IDEA due 
process hearings. The cloudiness stems from more than just 
Congress' conditional grant of funding to the states under the 
IDEA's Spending Clause structure. The evasion of political 
accountability in the Spending Clause context has been 
described before: federal legislators can point to states' 
voluntary decision to accept federal funds, while states may 
claim they could not, in practical terms, decline the funds. 51 
Neither the IDEA nor its legislative history, however, specifies 
the burden of proof procedure states must follow in 
administrative hearings once states have consented to federal 
regulation. 52 Congress left the IDEA burden-of-proof issue to 
the judiciary to decide, and the Supreme Court remained silent 
on whether states have the right to override the Court's own 
default rule. 
In setting the boundaries of its default rule in Schaffer, 
though, the Supreme Court did indicate which arm of the state 
students an enforceable substantive right to public education in participating states. 
See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988); see also Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 64 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) ("The IDEA ... casts an affirmative, beneficiary-specific obligation on 
providers of public education"). 
50. S chaffer, 546 U.S. at 52 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. 
Dist ., Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982)). 
51. S ee Note, Federalism, Political Accountability, and the Spending Clause, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1420, 1436 (1994) (analyzing the Supreme Court's differing levels 
of deference to congressional authority in the Commerce Clause a nd Spending Clause 
contexts, and calling for a "heightened sensitivity to t he ways in which conditional 
grants create impediment s to political accountability); see also Ann Althouse, 
Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 979, 1018 (1993) (noting that "[c]ooperative federalism can become a temptmg 
device for insula ting officeholders at both the state and federal levels"). 
52. IDEA 2004 provides only that a hearing officer's decision "shall be made on 
substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free 
appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i) (2005): With .respect to 
matters alleging procedural violations, the Act allows a heanng off1cer to fmd that .. a 
free appropriate public education was denied where the procedural 1~adequac1es: 1) 
impeded the child's r ight to a free appropriate public educatJOn, n) s1gmficantly 
impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decJswn- makmg process 
regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the pare~ts' ch1ld, or 
iii) cau sed a deprivation of educational benefits." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(u) (2005). 
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should decide the IDEA burden of proof allocation if left up to 
the states. The Court referred to the "laws or regulations" of 
several states that had placed the burden of proof on school 
districts by citing to statutes and regulations-not court 
decisions-from those states.53 Indeed, the Supreme Court's 
Schaffer decision made no mention of any state supreme court 
that had placed the burden of proof on the school district in a 
due process hearing challenging a student's IEP.54 During oral 
argument in Schaffer, Justice Scalia remarked that he was 
"loath to think that just because a State supreme court says 
that every school district in the State has to bear the burden of 
proof, that Congress intended that to be the case."55 
The Supreme Court has, in the past, cautioned federal 
courts against imposing their views concerning education on 
the states, explaining that courts lack the "specialized 
knowledge and experience" necessary to resolve difficult 
questions of educational policy.56 At the same time, federal 
courts have recognized that reducing all state standards to a 
federal mm1mum would conflict with the cooperative 
federalism that is the "structural principle undergirding the 
[IDEA] ."57 Calling on judicial respect for federalist principles, 
Justice Breyer's dissent in Schaffer acknowledged the Supreme 
Court's usual practice of leaving a "range of permissible choices 
to the States" when interpreting statutes designed to advance 
cooperative federalism. 58 Thus, interpreting the Supreme 
Court's Schaffer decision to support a preemptive, uniform 
53. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61. 
54. Prior to Schaffer, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had placed the burden of 
proof on the school district, regardless of which party sought relief. See Lascari v. Bel. of 
Educ. of Ra mapo Indian Hills Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 560 A.2d 1180, 1187-89 (1989), 
abrogated by L.E. v. Ram sey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 391 (3d Cir. 2006), discussed 
infra. a t note 81. 
55. Transcript of Oral Argument, at *49- 50, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-
698), 2005 WL 2651391. 
5(i. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207- 08. (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973). 
57. David D. v. Dartmouth Sch . Comm., 775 F.2d 411 , 419 (1st Cir. 1985). Other 
circuit courts later followed suit in r eaffirming states' au thority to exceed the federal 
floor under the ID EA, and enforcing more stringent state standards through the IDEA. 
See e.g , Johnson v. lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1029- 30 (lOth Cir. 1990) ; 
Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 982- 83 (4th Cir. 1990); Ed. of 
Educ. of East Windsor Reg'! Sch. Dist. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Blackmon v. Springfield R-XII Sch. Dist., 198 F.:3d 648, 658-59 (8th Cir. 2000). 
58. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 71 (Breyer, J ., dissenting) (quoting Wisconsin Dep't of 
Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 4 73, 495 (2002)). 
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burden-of-proof rule under the IDEA would mean federal 
interference with states on one level, and judicial interference 
with legislatures or administrative agencies on another. 
While silent on the burden-of-proof allocation, IDEA 
legislative history makes clear that Congress did not intend to 
wholly preempt the primacy of states in the field of special 
education. In explaining the Conference Committee Bill for the 
IDEA's predecessor in 1975, Senator Stafford remarked: "Make 
no mistake, educating our children is still very much a State 
responsibility, and this bill does not change that ... 59 By its 
very terms, the IDEA's purpose is to "assist" states in the 
provision of education for all children with disabilities.60 The 
IDEA's provisions reinforce states' traditional authority: each 
state seeking federal assistance must develop a plan which 
details the policies and procedures that ensure provision of a 
free appropriate public education in the least restrictive 
environment for all children with disabilities; 61 a free 
appropriate public education, in turn, must "meet the 
standards of the state educational agency;"62 each state must 
also establish the requisite procedural safeguards, including 
impartial due process hearings where aggrieved parents may 
present a complaint related to the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of their child, or the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to their child;63 each state must 
further ensure that local educational agencies in the state will 
establish the individualized education programs required by 
the Act. 64 
To the extent, then, that the majority in Schaffer 
determined that convenience and fairness considerations do not 
necessitate a departure from the ordinary default rule for 
assigning the burden of proof in special education due process 
hearings, that determination does not and should not bind 
states. Respondents in Schaffer, along with the United States, 
individual states, and school board associations filing as amici 
curiae in support of Respondents, agreed that "nothing in the 
59. Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. for Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 785 n.ll (1st 
Cir. 1984) citing 121 Cong. Rec. 37411 (Nov. 19, 1975). 
60. 20 U.S.C. ~ 1400(d) . 
Gl. 20 U.S. C. § 141 2(a)(l). 
G2. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(B). 
G:l. 20 U S.C. §§ 1412(a)(6)- 1415(f). 
G4. 20 U .S. C. § l 412(a)(4). 
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Act or applicable regulations prevents a State from going 
beyond what the IDEA requires and imposing a burden of proof 
on school systems in administrative hearings."65 Likewise, 
individual states filing as amiCI curiae in support of 
Petitioners66 urged the Supreme Court to explicitly recognize 
that states have the authority, consistent with the 
constitutional value of federalism, to direct that their local 
school districts bear the burden of proof in an IDEA 
administrative hearing.67 
The rationale offered by Respondents and amici for 
permitting states to adopt a different rule when dealing with 
the administration of a federal program ties back largely to the 
nature of Spending Clause legislation. Such statutes, like the 
IDEA, condition funding on compliance with minimum federal 
standards, but allow states to expand on those requirements 
and "grant additional benefits to their residents."68 The IDEA 
restricts states in their educational policy and resource 
allocation decisions only to the extent that the Secretary of 
Education does not approve the state plan for eligibility, and/or 
the state standards conflict with the federal Act's procedures.69 
Notably, the U.S. Department of Education has not reviewed 
the allocation of the burden of proof in determining states' 
65. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *17-
18, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698) , 2005 WL 1527082; Brief for Respondents 
at *48-49, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 WL I505062; Oral Argument 
at *36, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 WL 2651391 ("If States wanted 
to voluntarily assume the burden of proof for their own school districts in [due process) 
proceedings ... we think that States could do so, and that that would be the rule that 
applies. We don't quarrel with that); Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Hawaii , 
Alaska, a nd Oklahoma and the Territory of Guam in Support of Respondents at *8-11, 
Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698) , 2005 WL 1527081; Brief of Virgini a School 
Boards Association and Five Other School Board Associations as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at *13 and *17, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (04-698), 2005 WL 
1521614. 
66. Virginia, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, Rhode Island, 
Washington, a nd Wisconsin fiJed in support of Petitioners and in favor of placing the 
burden of proof on the school district. Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia a nd Eight 
Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at *1, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 
(2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 WL 1031635. 
67. Id. at *14-17. 
68. Brief for Respondents at *49, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 
WL 1505062; Oral Argument at *36-37, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 
WL 2651391. States also have plenary power to create school districts and define their 
powers. See Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Eight Other States as Amici 
Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at *15, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 
2005 WL 1031635. 
69. See, e.g., Battle v. Pa., 629 F.2d 269, 279-80 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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eligibility for funds under the IDEA. 70 
Ironically, Petitioners' argument in Schaffer that the 
burden of proof is a federal-law question-not open to the 
states to decide71 -undercuts Petitioners' preferred burden 
allocation, in light of the Supreme Court's current default rule. 
In matters primarily of state concern, however, the Supreme 
Court has long recognized that while "[t]he scope of a federal 
right is, of course, a federal question ... that does not mean 
that its content is not to be determined by state, rather than 
federal law."72 "The fact that Congress specified a number of 
details governing the IEP process does not indicate an 
intention to allocate the burden of proof one way or the 
other,"73 or to abrogate states' express directive to establish 
and maintain procedures for special education due process 
hearings. 74 Justice Breyer's dissent in Schaffer noted that the 
IDEA's minimum federal standards are "unrelated to the 
'burden of persuasion' question," and that "[n]othing in the Act 
suggests a need to fill every interstice of the Act's remedial 
scheme with a uniform federal rule."75 
The objection that an inconsistent pattern of burden 
assignment among the states runs counter to the IDEA's equal 
protection purpose76 also does not withstand scrutiny. 
Comparing the trend in school finance litigation (shifting to 
more expansive state constitutional rights) to the "burgeoning" 
trend in the area of special education (shifting to more 
expansive state statutory rights), the Fourth Circuit, for 
example, has quoted with approval state court decisions 
reconciling state law differentiation with the Equal Protection 
Clause: 
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards 
imposed upon us by the United States Supreme Court's 
70. Brief for the United Sta tes as Amicus Curiae Suppor ting Respondent a t *17, 
Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 WL 1527082. 
71. See Oral Argument at *6- 7, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 2005 
WL 2651391 ; Reply Brief of Petitioners at * 11, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-
698), 2005 WL 1812490. 
72. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). 
73 . Reply Brief of Petitioners at *12, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698), 
2005 WL 1812490. 
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) . 
75. Scha ffer, 546 U.S at 70 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
76. See Kevin Pendergast , Schaffer's Reminder: IDEA Needs Another 
Improvement, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 875, 884 (2006). 
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interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are free, 
and we are under a duty, to develop additional constitutional 
rights and privileges under our . . . [c]onstitution if we find 
such fundamental rights and privileges to be within the 
intention and spirit of our local constitutional language .. . 
We need not stand by idly and passively, waiting for 
constitutional direction from the highest court of the land. 
Instead[,] we should be moving concurrently to develop and 
expound the principles embedded in our constitutionallaw.77 
The states who filed as amici curiae in support of 
Petitioners in Schaffer similarly recognized that "the 
relationship between the IDEA and substantive state law is 
like the relationship between the United States Constitution 
and the State Constitutions."78 Thus, where Congress has 
chosen not to explicitly allocate the burden of proof in IDEA 
due process hearings, and when the Supreme Court has 
established a minimum default rule placing the burden of proof 
on the moving party in the absence of state legislation, states 
are then free to adopt more stringent procedures by statute or 
regulation79 without runmng afoul of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
IV. FEDERAL COURTS' PREEMPTION ANALYSES POST-SCHAFFER 
Federal courts have made clear that a state statute or 
regulation must contain explicit burden-of-proof language to 
avoid preemption under the IDEA, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in Schaffer. 80 Moreover, federal courts have 
77. Conklin v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 306, 32B (4th Cir. 
1991) (quoting Baker v. Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 40 1~02 (Alas ka 1970)). 
78. See Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Eight Other States as Amici 
Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at *16 n.l :3, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-
698), 2005 WL 10:31635; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 274-75 (2000) 
(recognizing the Supreme Court's established practice, rooted in federalis m, to a llow 
states wide discretion. subject to the minimum requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to experiment with solutions to difficult problems of policy). 
79. See infra discussion of L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ. a t note 81. 
80. See Kerry M. v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. # 114, No. 03 C 9349, 2006 WL 
2862 118, at *5 (N.D. Ill . Sept. 29, 2006) (holding Illinois' statutes do not expressly place 
a burden of proof on the school district sufficient to override the default rule in 
Schaffer). Illinois' statute provides only that a school district shall "present evidence 
that the special education needs of the child have been appropriately identified and 
that the special education program and related services proposed to meet the needs of 
the child are adequate, appropriate, and availa ble." 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-8.02a(g-
55) (emph asis added). The District Court in Kerry M. (citing section 8.02(h), superseded 
by section 8.02a for all impartial due process hearings requested on or after July 1, 
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understood that state statutes or regulations-not state 
courts-must provide the rule of law in a state that wishes to 
override the Supreme Court's default rule allocating the 
burden of proof to the moving party. 81 State legislatures are 
the arm of the state best equipped to determine the applicable 
burden of proof, as the legislative process can attract 
widespread input from state and local constituents, and 
constituents can hold elected officials accountable for the policy 
decisions they make. 
Nonetheless, in a decision filed in January of 2008, the 
Eighth Circuit read Schaffer to support the IDEA's preemption 
of Minnesota Statutes Section 125A.091, Subdivision 16, which 
allocates the burden of proof to the school district in a special 
education due process hearing.82 In reversing the decision of 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, the 
Eighth Circuit in M.M. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 pointed to its 
previous decision in Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11 v. 
Renollett, 440 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2006) as controlling law.83 
The Eighth Circuit in Renollett had, in a footnote, adjudged 
that allocating the burden of proof to the school district was 
harmless error, in light of Schaffer, given that the school 
district ultimately prevailed on the student's challenge to the 
district's provision of a free appropriate public education.84 
1997) read this language to refer to the burden of production, as distinguished from the 
burden of persuasion. Kerry M., 2006 WL 2862118, at *5. 
81. See L.E. , 435 F.3d at 391 (rejecting appellants' contention that Schaffer does 
not affect the burden of proof assigned by New Jersey's highest state court, where New 
Jersey lacks a "statutory or regulatory provision purporting to define the burden of 
proof in administrative hearings assessing IEPs"); see also Fisher v. Stafford Twp. Bd. 
of Educ., No. 05-2020, 2007 WL 674304, at *11 n.10 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2007) (finding 
that, "in the absence of a New Jersey statute or regulation placing the burden [of proof] 
on the school district, there is simply no reason to depart from" the Supreme Court's 
default rule in Schaffer). 
82. M.M., 512 F.3d at 458-59. MINN. STAT. § 125A.091 (2007), Subdivision 16 
provides, in pertinent part: "[t]he burden of proof at a due process hearing is on the 
district to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is complying with 
the law and offered or provided a free appropriate public education to the child in the 
least restrictive environment." 
83. M.M., 512 F.3d at 459. The Eighth Circuit also held t hat the burden of proof 
was improperly placed on the school district at an administrative hearing in West 
Platte R-II Sch. Dist. v. Wilson, 439 F.3d 782, 784--85 (8th Cir. 2006). However, that 
case did not present a preemption issue since Missouri law applied, and Missouri did 
not have any statute or regulation allocating the burden of proof in due process 
hearings under the IDEA. M.M. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-2270, 2006 WL 
2571229, at *14 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2006). 
84. 440 F.3d at 1010 n.3. 
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The District Court in M.M. had declined to follow Renollett 
on grounds that the Eighth Circuit neither referenced the 
Minnesota statutory allocation of the burden of proof, nor 
addressed the Supreme Court's express decision to set aside 
the question of states' authority to statutorily assign the 
burden of proof. 85 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit in M.M. 
explained that its "opinion in Renollett cited the page in 
Schaffer that left the question open, and ... then decided the 
question for ... courts [in the Eighth Circuit] ."86 The Eighth 
Circuit did not, however, offer any explanation as to why it 
interpreted Schaffer to preempt Minnesota's statute, given that 
the Supreme Court's holding was defined in the absence of 
state legislation allocating the relevant burden of proof. 
The District Court's holding in M.M., though overruled, 
should not be overlooked here. The Court cited case law 
emphasizing the IDEA's cooperative federalism design in 
support of the notion that, "for the purposes of the IDEA, 
where a state law is more stringent than a federal law, the two 
are consistent and the state law is not subject to federal 
preemption."87 Significantly, the District Court observed that 
the Supreme Court's holding in Schaffer was not based on any 
finding that allocation of the burden of proof to a school district 
interferes with the IDEA's substantive guarantees.88 Rather, 
the Supreme Court held that "[a]bsent some reason to believe 
that Congress intended otherwise ... we will conclude that the 
burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, on the party 
seeking relie£."89 In keeping with this logic, the District Court 
upheld states' authority to establish "more stringent 
procedures for effectuating the substantive guarantees of the 
85. M.M., 2006 WL 2571229 at *14-15. In a decision that post-dated Schaffer but 
pre-dated West Platte and Reno/lett, the United States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota found that the ALJ correctly placed the burden of proof at the 
administrative level on the school district in accordance with Minnesota law. See 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 701 v. J.T., No. Civ. 05-1892 DWFRLE, 2006 WL 517648, at *6 
n.6 (D. Minn. Feb. 28, 2006). 
86. M.M. , 512 F.3d at 459. The Eighth Circuit reversed on the merits both "the 
ALJ's award of compensatory educational services and the District Court's award of 
attorneys' fees under the IDEA." Id.; see also P.K.W.G. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No . 11, No. 
07-402 3, 2008 WL 2405818, *9 (D . Minn. June 11, 2008) (citing M.M. and Renollett in 
holding that federal law preempts Minn. Stat. § 125A.091, subd. 16 to the extent it 
places the burden of proof in an IDEA due process hearing always on the school 
district) . 
87. M.M., 2006 WL 2571229 at *16 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
88. !d. 
89. Id. (quoting Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57-58). 
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IDEA," in the absence of evidence that Congress intended to 
impose the "default rule" on states which assign the burden 
differently .9° 
By way of a footnote in two separate cases post-dating 
Schaffer, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
similarly upheld the validity of the then-current D.C. 
regulation91 placing the burden of proof at the administrative 
level on the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS).92 The 
District Court recognized the limited nature of the Supreme 
Court's Schaffer holding, defined in the absence of state 
legislation specifically allocating the burden of proof in an 
IDEA due process hearing.93 
Likewise, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Georgia acknowledged the preemption issue left unresolved 
by the Supreme Court in Schaffer and applied Georgia's then-
current Board of Education Rules94 to determine the applicable 
90. M.M., 2006 WL 2571229 at *16. Other post-Schaffer federal court decisions 
have upheld the application of a state statute placing the burden of proof on the school 
district , without needing to reach the preemption issue. In Escambia, for example, the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama found that Alabama's 
regulations at the time of the administrative decision specifically imposed the burden 
of proof on school districts in IEP due process hearings. Escambia County Bd. of Educ. 
v. Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1264-65 (S.D. Ala. 2005). The school board did not 
raise any argument that Schaffer 's default rule took precedence over Alabama's 
regulations; rather, the school board unsuccessfully argued that the Court should apply 
an amendment to Alabama's Department of Education regulations tha t went into effect 
more than a year and a half after the hearing officer issued the administrative 
decision. ld. at 1263-65. 
91. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5, § 3030.3 (2003) provided: "The [school district] shall 
bear the burden of proof, based solely upon the evidence and testimony presented at 
the hearing, that the action or proposed placement is adequate to meet the educational 
needs of the student." Section 3030.3 was later amended, effective June 30, 2006, to 
place the burden of proof upon the party seeking relief. 
92. See Gellert v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 435 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 n.3 (D.D.C. 2006); 
Schoenbach v. D.C., No. 05-1591 (RMC), 2006 WL 1663426, at *4 n.3 (D.D.C. June 12, 
2006) . Note that two earlier cases in this District cited to Schaffer for the burden of 
proof without any mention of D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5, § 3030.3. See Hester v. D.C. , 433 
F. Supp. 2d 71, 76 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd on other grounds, Hester v. D.C., 505 F.3d 1283 
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Savoy-Kelly v. E. High School, No. Civ.A. 04-1751(GK), 2006 WL 
1000346, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2006). Two other cases in this District assumed, 
without having to decide, the validity of the D.C. regulation placing the burden of proof 
on the school district. See Roark ex rel. Roark v. D.C., 460 F. Supp. 2d 32, 39 n .6 
(D.D.C. 2006); Jenkins v. D.C., No. Civ.A. 02-01055 HHK, 2005 WL 3371048, at *2 n.4 
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2005) . 
93. Gellert, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 22 n.3. 
94. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160·4-7-.18(1)(g)(8)(2000) provided, in pertinent part: 
"Generally, the [school district] shall bear the burden of coming forward with the 
evidence and burden of proof at any administrative hearing to establish that the 
proposed IEP is appropriate and provides FAPE. If the parents propose a placement 
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burden of proof. 95 In holding that the ALJ properly placed the 
burden of proof on the parent at the administrative hearing, 
the District Court reasoned that the case fell within the latter 
category set forth under the state rule: the parent sought a 
more restrictive placement than the one provided by the 
existing, agreed upon IEP.96 
Even more recently, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Connecticut held, in two unrelated decisions, that the burden 
of proof should be placed upon the school district during an 
IDEA administrative hearing, in accordance with Connecticut 
Department of Education regulations providing that the public 
agency has the burden of proving the appropriateness of a 
child's existing or proposed educational program or 
placement. 97 
Thus, the Eighth Circuit's answer to the preemption 
question left open in Schaffer stands alone among the answers 
of federal courts98 that have decided the question in the 
presence of a state statute or regulation expressly assigning 
the burden of proof to the school district in a special education 
due process hearing. On October 20, 2008, the U.S. Supreme 
Court denied a petition for review of the Eighth Circuit's 
decision in M.M.Y9 In denying the petition, the Supreme Court 
that is more restrictive than provided by an existing agreed upon lEP, the parents 
shall bear the burden of establishing that the more t'estrictive environment is 
appropriate." GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-4-7-.18(1)(g)(8) was amended effective May 1, 
2006, and subsequently amended in the form of section 160-4-7-.12(il)(l) effective .July 
1, 2007, to eliminate the hybrid structure and place the burden of persuasion and 
burden of production upon the party seeking relief at the administrative bearing. 
95. W.C. ex. rel. Sue C. v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1:151, 1:359 
(N.D. Ga. 2005). 
96. Id. 
97. P. ex. rel. Mr. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 512 F. Supp. 2d 89, 99 (D. Conn. 
2007); see also Brennan v. Reg'] Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 531 F. Supp. 2d 245, 267 
(D. Conn. Jan. 4, 2008) (agreeing with Justice Breyer's dissent in Schaffer, "which 
concluded that the IDEA's model of cooperative federalism did not intend to preempt 
states' abilities to determine the burden of proof for themselves." 546 U.S. at 69-70 
(Breyer J. dissenting)). But see M.K. v. Sergi, 554 F. Supp. 2d 201, 221 (D. Conn. 
2008). The court in M.K. confused the burden of persuasion with the burden of 
production when describing Judge Hall's holding from Brennan. Judge Hall recognized 
that the moving party retains the burden of production not the burden of persuasion 
- under Connecticut law. Brennan, 5:31 F. Supp. 2d at 267. Accordingly, while the 
court in M.K. purported to agree with ,Judge Hall, the court actually n'achm! the 
opposite finding that plaintiffs, as the parties challenging the adequacy of the l EPs, 
bore the initial burden of persuasion. M.K., 554 F. Supp. 2d at 221. 
98. Notwithstanding the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut's 
decision in M.K. u. Sergi, discussed supra at note 97. 
99. M.M., 2008 WL 2442939 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2008). 
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passed up an opportunity to both decide states' authority to 
override the default rule based on the case at hand, and 
uniformly align federal courts' treatment of state burden of 
proof statutes and regulations with the IDEA's cooperative 
federalism design. The issue of states' authority will likely re-
surface before the Supreme Court, however, given the potential 
for a split among federal circuit courts faced with applying 
Schaffer in states that have assigned the burden of proof to 
school districts by statute or regulation. 
V. THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPE OF STATE LEGISLATION ON THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
The Supreme Court's default rule in Schaffer resolved the 
Circuit Court split on the IDEA burden allocation in line with 
states that had assigned the burden of proof to the moving 
party, either by statute 100 or court precedent. 101 Thus, Schaffer 
did not change the customary burden in those states. Schaffer's 
impact, however, has not been limited to states without IDEA-
specific burden-of-proof legislation in jurisdictions that had 
customarily assigned the burden of proof to the school district. 
Rather, in the wake of Schaffer, states with and without 
statutes or regulations allocating the burden of proof have 
moved to amend or newly legislate the burden assignment to 
either align with or depart from the Supreme Court's default 
rule.I02 
100. See 707 KY. ADMIN. REGS.1:340, Section 11(4) (2004), incorporating by 
reference KY. REV. STA'I'. ANN. § 13B.090(7) (West 2007) ("In all administrative 
hearings . . . the party proposing the agency take action or grant a benefit has the 
burden to show the propriety of the agency action or entitlement to the benefit 
sought"); 511 IND. ADMI N. CODE, 7-30-3 (2003), incorporating by reference IND. CODE§ 
4- 21.5-8-14 (2002) (" ... the agency or other person requesting that a n agency take 
action ... has the burden of persuasion and the burden of going forward with the proof 
of the request ... "). 
101. Prior to the Supreme Court's Schaffer decision, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Tenth and El eventh Circuits had assigned the burden of proof to the moving party. 
States under the jurisdiction of these Circuits that did not have state statutes or 
regulations expressly assigning the burden of proof included: Colorado, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
102. Of the seven states that had expressly assigned the burden of proof to school 
districts by statute or regulation at the time of Schaffer, four states have maintained 
that burden allocation to date: Connecticut, Delaware, Minnesota, and West Virginia. 
(The burden of proof provision in West Virginia now appears under Policy 2419: 
Regula tions for the Education of Students with Exceptionalities, incorporated by 
reference under W.VA. Com: R. § 126-16-3 (2008)) . Alaska, Washington D.C. , and 
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The problem lies m state officials' and interested 
constituents' efforts to bolster or restrict states' movements 
based on compliance with the Supreme Court's Schaffer 
decision. An emphasis on compliance diverts attention from 
states' authority to independently assign the burden of proof, 
and threatens both the integrity and passage of state 
legislation. 
Following Schaffer, the Education Commissioner in Alaska 
sought to change Alaska's burden of proof regulation, which 
placed the burden of proof at all due process hearings on the 
school district, even if the parent requested the hearing. 103 The 
Commissioner recognized that the Supreme Court specifically 
mentioned Alaska's burden of proof regulation in Schaffer, and 
was "leaving for another day" the question of whether state 
laws placing the burden of proof on the school district would be 
permitted under federallaw. 104 Nonetheless, the Commissioner 
submitted a proposed amendment to Alaska's regulation that 
would shift the IDEA burden of proof from the school district to 
the party that requests a hearing, in an effort "to conform to 
the November 14th U.S. Supreme Court ruling." 105 At a Board 
of Education meeting where the proposed amendment was 
later adopted, Alaska's Assistant Attorney General clarified 
that the amendment would align the state's due process 
procedures with federal law, but that the change was a matter 
Georgia represent those states that, following Schaffer, shifted their regulatory burden 
of proof in IDEA due process hearings to the moving party. Of those states that did not 
have any state statute or regulation allocating the burden of proof in special education 
due process hearings at the time of Schaffer, New York, New Jersey, Hawaii, Virginia, 
California, and Pennsylvania have since moved to legislatively assign the burden of 
proof to the school district . As of the date this article was submitted for publication, 
the legislative measures failed in Hawaii, Virginia, and California, and were pending 
in Pennsylvania. According to New Jersey's Public Advocate, parent movements are 
building to pass legislation shifting the burden of proof to school districts in Arizona, 
Illinois, Massachusetts, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. See SPECIAL EDUCATION 
DUE PROCESS, supra note 26, at 17 n .31 (Jan. 2007). Maryland, the jurisdiction of the 
administrative hearing in Schaffer, amended § 8-413 of its Annotated Code, effective 
July 1, 2006, to mirror the IDEA's provisions regarding hearing officer decisions under 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i)-(ii), without expressly assigning the burden of proof. See 
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 8-413(g)(1)-(2) (West 2008). 
103. Memorandum from Roger Sampson, Comm'r to Members of the Ala. State Bd. 
of Educ. & Early Dev. (Nov. 30, 2005) (discussing attached proposed amendments to 
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550(e)(9), now codified in pertinent part at 
§ 52.550(i)(ll) (2008)) . 
104. !d. 
105. !d. 
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of policy, not law. 106 
The D.C. Board of Education also drafted a resolution to 
align D.C.'s burden-of-proof regulation with the Schaffer 
decision. The resolution presented and later adopted by 
members of the D.C. Board of Education similarly referenced 
the Supreme Court's holding in Schaffer, and stated, in 
pertinent part: "Title 5, DCMR, Section 3030.3[, requiring the 
school district to prove the adequacy of its special education 
plans when challenged by parents,] is inconsistent with the 
current ruling and should be amended to bring [the District of 
Columbia Public Schools (DCPS)] into compliance with the 
Congressional intent of IDEA as interpreted by the US 
Supreme Court." 107 Interestingly, the Council of Great City 
Schools, a coalition of large urban public school systems in the 
United States, submitted a report to DCPS following the 
Schaffer decision that targeted D.C.'s burden-of-proof 
regulation as a "root" of the problem facing D.C.'s budgeting for 
special education. 108 Having concluded that D.C.'s special 
education costs were "warping the school system's overall 
expenditures," the Council recommended a reversal of D.C.'s 
burden-of-proof regulation, among other measures, to help 
reduce costs. 109 
Two years earlier, however, the D.C. Appleseed Center had 
released a joint report with DLA Piper LLP, finding that an 
estimated one-third of all due process hearings arose from 
DCPS's failure to comply with previous hearing officer 
decisions or to implement settlement agreements. 110 Additional 
hearing requests were filed because DCPS failed to timely 
evaluate children, develop IEPs, and/or respond to parents' 
questions and concerns. 111 Notably, the Appleseed report's 
106. Minutes of State Bd. of Educ. and Early Dev. Meeting at 6 (Mar. 16, 2006). 
107. D.C. Bd. ofEduc. Res. SR06·20 at 1 (D.C. 2006). 
108. COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., FINANCING EXCELLENCE IN THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS: REVIEW OF FINANCE AND BUDGET OPERATIONS OF THE 
D.C. PUBLIC SCHOOLS 57 (2005). The report was requested by then D.C . School's 
Superintendent Dr. Clifford B. Janey shortly after he took office in September 2004. Id. 
at 53. The Council conducted its site visit to the D.C. Public Schools from February 27 
through March 2, 2005. Id. at 13. 
109. !d. at 73. 
110. D.C. APPLESEED CTR. & PIPER RUDNICK LLP, A TIME FOR ACTION: THE NEED 
TO REPAIR THE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING SPECIAL EDUCATION DISPUTES IN THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA 18, 28 (2003) , 
http://www.dcappleseed.org/projects/publications/Special_Ed_Rprt.pdf. 
111. ld. at 6, 28. See also Letter from The Council of Parent Attorneys and 
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recommendations to DCPS made no mention of shifting the 
burden of proof away from school districts. 112 
In New York, some time passed before the burden of proof 
was shifted to the school district by statute. The burden-of-
proof legislation signed by former New York State Governor 
Eliot Spitzer on August 15, 2007 113 revived the bills vetoed by 
former Governor George Pataki on July 26, 2006. 114 As initially 
introduced and passed by both houses of the New York State 
Legislature in 2006, the bills would have placed the burden of 
proof in impartial due process hearings on the school district or 
responsible state agency and restored the pre-Schaffer status 
quo in New York. 115 In exercising his veto, Governor Pataki 
recognized that the Supreme Court declined to reach the 
question of whether states could shift the burden of proof to 
school districts. 116 Nonetheless, his veto message set forth the 
position of opponents to the bill, 117 who argued "that federal 
law does not authorize shifting the burden of proof in IDEA 
Advocates, Inc. (COPAA) to Russell Smith, Executive Dir., D.C. Bd. of Educ. 2 (Apr. 20 , 
2006) (regarding proposed change to District of Columbia burden of proof municipal 
regulation, D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5, § 3030.3 (2003)). 
112. Rather. the report recommended that DCPS and the District government 
focus on (i) providing the necessary resources to address existing deficiencies in 
assessment and placement services in D.C. neighborhood schools , (ii) establishing clear 
lines of a uthority for specia l education program responsibilities and holding DCPS 
personnel accountable for matters assigned to them, (iii) providing and publicizing 
procedures for resolving dispu tes at an early stage (such as mediation and facilitation 
services through a n independent dispute resolution organization), and (iv) improvi ng 
the administration of due process hearings through a dequate staffing, training, a nd 
organizational restructuring. D.C. APPLESEED CTR. & PlPElt RUDN ICK LLP, supra note 
110, at 11-13. The report noted that any short-term increases in spending resulting 
from the proposed recommendations would be outweighed by substantial long-term 
cost savings resulting from redirecting funds to the "actual delive ry of special education 
services and in avoiding the escalating costs that occur when children's needs are 
neglected." Id. at 13. 
113. See Associa ted Press, Law puts burden of proof on schools in special education 
disputes, NEWSDAY, Aug. 16, 2007. The a mendment to§ 4404 of New York's Education 
Law, effective October 14, 2007, provides that the school district bear the burden of 
persuasion and burden of production in any impartia l hearing, except where parents 
seek tuition reimbursement for a unilateral placement in a private school. N.Y. Euuc. 
LAw§ 4404 (McKinney 2007). 
114. See Governor George E. Pataki Veto Message No. 286. 
115. See Schaffer u. Weast Passed Both Houses of Legislature, NYSARC, Inc., 
(updated July 5, 2006), http://www.nysarc.org/news-info/nysarc-news-view-story-
detail.asp?var ID= 103. 
116. See Governor George E. Pataki Veto Message No. 286. 
117. Governor Pataki noted that the New York State Education Department , the 
New York City Department of Education, the New York State School Boards 
Association, and th e Conference of Big 5 School Districts all opposed passage of Senate 
Bill No. 8354. Id. 
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cases." 118 Governor Pataki premised his disapproval of the bill 
on the fact that final regulations implementing IDEA 2004 
were not yet promulgated, and that these regulations could 
establish a uniform national rule that would preempt any 
inconsistent state law. 119 The final implementing regulations 
ultimately did no such thing. 120 
On January 14, 2008, New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine 
signed into law state legislation which, effective immediately, 
placed both the burden of persuasion and burden of production 
on school districts in special education due process hearings. 121 
In opposition to the proposed legislation, the New Jersey 
School Boards Association had frequently characterized the bill 
as an attempt to "circumvent" a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling. 122 
A similar objection was voiced at a local school board 
meeting in Virginia, where the Director of Community 
Relations and Legislative Services for the school district 
commented that the Virginia Senate bill-intended to assign 
school districts the burden of persuasiOn m IDEA 
administrative hearings-is "inconsistent with current legal 
principle and/or court decisions." 123 The Virginia Senate 
ultimately left the bill in the Committee on Education and 
Health.124 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Sec 71 Fed. Reg. 46540, 46706 (Aug. 14, 2006). 
121. The Star-Ledger Continuous News Desk, Legislation Signed, Vetoed by 
Corzine, N.J.com, J an . 15, 2008. See N.J . Senate Bill No. 2604, supplementing N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 18A:46 (West 2008). The Supreme Court of New Jersey has since upheld 
the Legi slature's allocation of the burden of proof to the local school district in due 
process hearings concerning the "identification, evaluation, reevaluation , classification, 
educational placement, [] provision of a free, a ppropriate public education, or 
disciplin ary action, of a child with a disability." Bd. of Educ. of Ci ty of Sea Isle City v. 
Kennedy, 196 N .• J. 1, 20-21 (2008). 
122 . New J ersey School Boards Association, New J er sey's Weekly Education News 
Report, Volume XXX Number 28 at 2 (Mar. 8, 2007); see also New Jersey School Boards 
Association. New ,Jersey's Weekly Education News Report , Volume XXX Number 38 a t 
1 (May 17, 2007); New Jersey School Boards Associa tion, New J ersey's Weekly 
Education News Report. Volume XXX Number 39 at 1 (May 24, 2007) . 
128. See Draft Minutes of the School Board of the Ci ty of Newport News, Regular 
Session (Oct. 17, 2006) . 
124. See S.B. 241 Bill Tracking (2007 session), http://leg l. sta te.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504 .exe'?071 +sum+SB241. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's holding in Schaffer-premised on 
federal statutory silence and defined in the absence of state 
legislation-has left room for a variant of Justice Breyer's 
dissent to emerge in practice. States retain the ability to 
determine their own burden-of-proof rules in special education 
due process hearings, not through an ALJ's application of 
general administrative rules, but through a legislative or 
regulatory process that solicits widespread, IDEA-specific 
input. 
For states to fully realize their roles as "vital cells" of 
democratic action however, experimentation and accountability 
must replace efforts to conform. State action or inaction on the 
burden allocation should reflect actual state policy choices-
rather than compliance with the federal default rule-and 
state legislatures and officials should be held responsible for 
those choices. At the same time, courts interpreting Schaffer 
should recognize that the IDEA's model of cooperative 
federalism did not intend to preempt states' abilities to 
independently assign the burden of proof by statute or 
regulation. The interests of children, parents, educators, school 
administrators, disability rights advocates, taxpayers, and 
state and federal governments are all at stake. 
